Introduction

The Interrelatedness of Private Law and Private International Law
The development of Private law on a European level showcases a focus on social aims, arguably much more than this is the case on a national level. This becomes apparent in the field of consumer law. Private law issues within the EU therefore revolve around interests of the parties (the citizens), the (internal) market and the state. These 3 interest groups have been the stakeholders in projects on private law and private international law alike. Where consumer protection was initially to be achieved by way of private international law on a European scale (Rome I and Brussels I Regime), recent plans initiated by the Commission, take a more aggressive approach to achieving consumer protection and the further development of the internal market. A Common European Sales law 1 (hitherto CESL) has been proposed as a substantive law alternative towards the creation of consumer law.
Where the Proposal for a Common European Sales Law (CESL) and the Regulation on the law applicable to contractual obligations 2 (hitherto Rome I Regulation) serve the primary aim to enhance cross border trade, there is a related aim of (in particular) Article 6 of the Rome I Regulation as well as in the CESL in general to protect consumers.
3
The CESL is the product of a long on going debate on the need for harmonized contract law in the Union, or even private law in general. As such it has been the subject of discussion on the subsidiarity and proportionality of such an instrument. In total, 4 governments have issued subsidiarity complaints in accordance with the Protocol thus restricts private autonomy for the sake of the protection of a public interest. This is necessary to prevent parties from being able to choose the law that is least advantageous to the consumer and circumvent mandatory rules of any country that has a sufficiently close link to the contract, such as that of the place of performance or the forum. PIL has thus served to set a minimum standard of consumer protection by preventing fraud/ forum shopping and exploitation of an inexperienced (passive) consumer. 12 This is where the Common European Sales law steps in to serve as a more aggressive/harmonizing instrument by introducing common mandatory rules.
Application mechanism
The interaction between the Common European Sales law and the Rome I Regulation is a result of the complicated application mechanism that was chosen by the commission.
The commission had the choice between an optional instrument as a 28 th regime (now a 29 th regime) or a 2 nd regime of national law. 13 As the CESL is not a mandatory law, as oppose to for example the UNCITRAL Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG), its application has to be determined by the autonomous conflict rules, which within the European Union will be the Rome I Regulation.
14 A 28 th Regime denotes that the CESL would have existed alongside the 27 (now 28) national legal systems. Parties could then have chosen the CESL instead of a law of a
Instead it was opted for what is referred to as a 2 nd regime of national law. This went hand in hand with a more complicated application process. The Rome I regulation as autonomous set of conflict rules remains applicable also where CESL is a 2 nd regime. 19 This is due to the fact that choosing the CESL will have to be done via a two-step approach:
Firstly, the parties will have to choose the law of a member state as applicable law in accordance with Article 3 Rome I. Then, within this national law, parties have the choice between the sales law under the ordinary law of the member state and the CESL as 2 nd regime of national law. These co-exist within the national legal order.
The first reason for introducing CESL as a 2 nd regime rather than a 28 th regime is due to its interaction with the Rome I Regulation and in particular Article 3, which stipulates that "the contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties". There was uncertainty as to whether parties could choose a non-state law under Article 3, and an amendment of 22 Accordingly, the CESL is being introduced as part of the national laws instead of in addition to them to give the illusion of approximation. They argue that due to the preference of Article 114, the commission has chosen for an overly complicated system with a complex application mechanism. 23 It will however still need to be seen whether the CJEU will approve of such disguise.
Doctrinal Reservations
Almost the entire range of articles consulted has voiced criticism of the commission approach as it stands. Criticism revolves around the classification of the CESL as national law and the envisaged application of the Rome I regulation. The effectiveness of the mandatory rules of the forum was undesirable for the commission by way of 2 reasons, very much intertwined with the objectives to be achieved by the CESL.
Firstly, the effectiveness of the overriding mandatory provisions of the member states is not desirable as it endangers the achievement of the first objective of the CESL, the further development of the internal market. The application of the mandatory rules by the member states leads to 27 different versions of the CESL, which would undermine to a great extent the objective of the CESL. 32 Businesses trading with consumers would to a large extent still have to take into account the mandatory rules of the consumer's habitual residence.
Secondly, as the second objective of the CESL is the protection of consumers in order to facilitate the conclusion of consumer contracts within the internal market, a central point of argumentation has since been the level of consumer protection under the CESL. The objective was to design a full set of consumer protection rules, which safeguard a high level of protection. However, due to its optional nature, the regime has to be attractive to businesses in order to be chosen to govern the respective contract. Therefore, a balance was struck between the interest of businesses and consumers. It was therefore not aimed for the highest protection, albeit it is claimed that the consumer protection under CESL has not been taken affirmatively by a number of member states, which argue that the member state laws may provide for a higher level of protection, especially in specific cases, although this is clearly not the case in every situation that could arise. Bisping gives the example of a more favourable cancellation right under German law. 34 The main concern with the neutralization of mandatory rules is therefore the neutralization of those that constitute consumer protection rules.
We have seen that the choice of the CESL is subject first to a choice of national law in accordance with the Rome I regulation, and then another agreement between the parties to choose the CESL instead of the national law regime. The reason for taking a 2-step approach is a desired neutralization of Article 6. Article 6 (2) Rome I, which offers a special connecting factor for consumer contracts, stipulates that
"such a choice may not, however, have the result of depriving the consumer of the protection afforded to him by provisions that cannot be derogated from by agreement by virtue of the law which, in the absence of choice, would have been applicable on the basis of paragraph 1 (emphasis added)."
Article 6(2) Rome I regulates the applicability of provisions that cannot be derogated from by agreement. In this section, the paper will give a definition of what this notion comprises.
In the following those rules will be referred to as "mandatory rules" (or mandatory provisions, MP), as this is the notion generally preferred by literature. 35 Mandatory rules encompass a very wide range of rules. Their content is not easy to grasp as it is subject to national interpretations, which also require an interpretation and demarcation of the notion of ordre public. 36 Generally, the description "rules which cannot be derogated from by agreement" is a fitting albeit vague explanation. Academia makes a distinction between internal and international mandatory rules. 37 International mandatory rules will be referred to as "Overriding mandatory provisions" (hitherto OMP), as this is done in literature consulted and fits the terminology chosen under the Rome I regulation. Art. 6(2)
Rome I refers to internal mandatory rules. Internal mandatory rules are the rules prescribed 
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by a certain national contract law, which the parties cannot alter by agreement. These include the characteristic provisions of a private law regime, in which private autonomy is not infringed upon. Generally however, these provisions can be circumvented by the choice of a different national law. Then, the mandatory rules of the chosen law will be applied instead.
38
It appears that Art. 6(2) makes all mandatory provisions of the consumer's habitual residence overriding ones, due to its formulation. 39 They are further halbzwingendes Recht, being mandatory in the sense that they can only not be derogated from to the disadvantage of the weaker party. Within the scope of the article, as soon as the weaker party (the consumer) is protected by the provision, it will not be possible to derogate from it, which attaches a higher importance for the protection of the weaker party to them, than that which is generally accorded to overriding mandatory provisions. However, the difference to "real" OMP is that here the party invoking the rule will not have to prove that the rule is crucial for the organization of society (any mandatory rule will qualify). 40 Under
Article 6 a limitation has been imposed however, on this application mechanism. MP apply only if a business has directed its marketing towards the consumer's home country, therefore in a situation where the consumer does not leave his habitual residence and only when the transaction takes place in the consumers country.
41
The commission argues that the respective article will be rendered ineffective if the CESL was chosen as applicable law. CESL is a uniform law, which will have the same content everywhere. 42 Therefore, the CESL as chosen under German law encompasses the same level of protection as the one under French law and the consumer will not have been deprived of protection under the law of another member state. This argumentation has been questioned, due to several reasons.
Firstly, it is questionable whether the CESL does indeed harmonize the contract law of the member states for B2C contracts. Recital 27 of the Proposal for the Regulation lays down the instances, in which gaps have been left, which will have to be filled by the national laws of the member states. Therefore, scholars have contested that the CESL constitutes a full set of consumer protection rules. 43 Indeed, the gap filling will have to be done by the 
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national laws of the member states. It is at this moment questionable whether the national applicable law will have to be determined again by the Rome I regulation or whether the choice of the national law by the parties under which they have chosen the CESL will be the applicable law for gap-filling. If not, the application of the CESL will run into even more problems as the applicable law in absence of choice will not necessarily be the same as the one chosen by the parties. Consider a situation where a consumer in Germany deals with a
French business and where the consumer has agreed to an application of French law and the CESL. Will it now be the French law, which will fill the gaps or will the law be applied via Rome I, which is applicable in the absence of choice? This will then be the law of the place where the consumer has his habitual residence, in accordance with Article 6 (1) Rome I, in this case German law, as the consumer deals from Germany, given of course that German law accords a higher level of protection. Notwithstanding this, it must be noted that the legal department of the Parliament acknowledges the possibility that the "first" choice of national law "may be an indication of an implicit will to choose the law of that member state" to fill the gaps. 44 We can see that as it stands now, the CESL does not create a uniform set of laws but rather that 28 different versions of the CESL are being created by application via Rome I, namely a CESL with gaps filled by French law, one with German law and so on. The question that this paper tries to answer is however more connected to the question whether or not there is another way to impose consumer protection rules and whether this will persist with further harmonization. The gap-filling could be a way of doing so, as gaps are left with regards to illegality/immorality.
Next, it is possible to question the reasoning of the Commission with regards to the comparison mechanism of consumer protection rules under Art. 6(2)Rome I. The comparison of consumer protection under this article, which aims at awarding the consumer the higher consumer protection, must be done between the law chosen and the domestic law of the consumer, which would be available in the absence of choice. It has been argued, that this will never be the CESL, as the parties must explicitly choose the CESL. 45 While the commission maintains its argumentation that this will also be the CESL, authors have doubted this 
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The legal department solves this problem by putting forward that the CESL will be the same regime under all national laws. Therefore the consumer protection afforded under the CESL subject to German law will be the same as that afforded under the CESL subject to French law, as the CESL offers a full set of consumer protection rules.
48
The crucial point of argumentation here may be that mandatory provisions are internal mandatory rules. 49 The applicability under Art. 6(2) in an international setting (where the applicable law is the consumer's home law) is therefore a constructed one, where the article itself makes these rules overriding, whereas in reality and according to interpretation by the national courts not all of them are. 50 They cannot be contracted out of by the parties within the framework of the particular legal system, but may be excluded by a different choice of law. As such, they constitute typical provisions of contract law. 51 Generally, they are therefore only to be applied in internal situations. The application of mandatory rules in internal situations is provided for under Art. 3(3) Rome I.
52
In light of the CESL, the mandatory provisions protecting the consumer are neutralized, according to the legal department's publication, as they determine their scope unilaterally.
53
This is due to the fact that the 1 st (national law) and 2 nd regime (CESL) co-exist in the national legal orders, where both are national in the sense that they are national private law. This is in line with Piers and Van Leenhove's argument that the choice of CESL does not amount to a choice of law but rather "incorporation by reference", and by way of this classification justify that Art. 6 (2) has no legal and practical importance. 54 Therefore the 2 nd regime cannot be incompatible with the mandatory provisions of the 1 st regime as they are also part of the national legal order. The 2 nd regime is not inferior to the first one, when it is chosen. It rather supplants the corresponding rules of the 1 st regime. This leads to a situation where there are, with regards to consumer protection 2 regimes of national mandatory rules that coexist. As both are deemed national law, one can never be incompatible with the other.
Due to the principle of party autonomy, the parties have excluded the applicability of the national law rules that deal with the same subjects and therefore also the mandatory rules.
3 Application of Overriding Mandatory Provisions (ART. 9) and Ordre Public (ART.21)
The Rome I regulation provides for an extensive set of rules regulating the rules enforcing the member states' national interests, as is typical for private international law.
An important aspect to take into consideration is therefore jurisdiction as a dependence on the national laws is inherent to this category of provisions. The national judges are experts at applying their own contract laws. Therefore, the choice/allocation of the forum is of importance. However, the respective drafters adhered to the Principle of Gleichlauf of the Rome I and Brussels I regulation when they were transformed from Conventions to
Regulations. This means that it was tried to reach connected conflict rules for jurisdiction and applicable law issues, much like in the case of consumer contracts. 56 So it happens that Article 6 Rome I corresponds with Article 15 Brussels I in that it favours the courts and the law of the consumer. Storme claims that as law will be applied by national and regional judges, there will never be a neutral assessment of Ordre Public and Overriding mandatory provisions. National judges will want to give effect to the national law. 57 Can they do so?
Ordre Public (Öffentliche Ordnung (D))
First, we will examine the possibility to impose mandatory rules via the ordre public exception, which is regulated under Article 21 Rome I Regulation. It provides that 
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"the application of a provision of the law of any country specified by this Regulation may be refused only if such application is manifestly incompatible with the public policy (ordre public) of the forum (emphasis added)."
Ordre Public or Public Order is a means of last resort for Member states to enforce their interests. It enables a state to refuse the application of the law of any country, whether chosen by the parties or deemed applicable via the application of conflict rules. 58 However, this is only the case where the applied law would be manifestly incompatible with the public order provisions of the member state that is the forum. 59 It becomes clear that this can only be the case in a very limited amount of situations, as the public order exception responds to the most basic vital interests of a country in safeguarding its national policy.
It corresponds with the basic notions of morality and justice that form the state's inherent value system. Von Bar calls ordre public the conditio sine qua non of the emancipation of conflict of law rules from substantive law, highlighting the importance of creating a safeguard against the objectively applicable law, without which the states would be unwilling to adhere to a system of conflict rules.
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Further the application mechanism can be described as a "negative" one. 61 The public order exception does not correspond to one specific provision, unlike the mandatory rules in Article 6, but rather to a general principle of justice and morality. Therefore, one cannot really say that public order is being "applied". It rather "imposes" itself, or as Pauknerova calls it "is invoked", after the application of the applicable law and consequently intervenes with regards to the rules that would otherwise be applicable as part of the applicable law.
Public order is therefore of a defensive nature, only to be employed in the most limited that, the competence of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) to exercise its discretion with regards to the exercise of public policy by the member states may not be discarded. The Court has specified that the impact of the exercise of the exception is restricted where it will undermine the construction of the European Union. 64 It has since even decided that a common definition is required for the member states and that they have the obligation to exercise their right in line with the principle of sincere cooperation and that of proportionality.
65
With regards to secondary EU legislation, it is commonly understood that member states may refer to their public order during the drafting process and negotiations. Once a particular legislation is adopted however, they will lose the right to invoke it.
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This proves to be especially helpful for determining there remains any possibility for the member states to apply their public policy exception in order to guard their interests when applying the CESL. It seems safe to say that this will not be the case. restrictions. 88 Especially within the European Union, this might seem imperative, with regards to the principle of mutual recognition, however courts are generally not obliged to give effect.
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Under the Rome Regime, the applicability of the different types of OMP is further regulated in subsections 2 and 3 of Article 9 Rome I. Sub. 2 allows the application of OMP of the law of the forum (note the link to jurisdiction) and Sub. 3 refers to the application of the OMP of the place of performance, whereas here, restrictions on application exist.
This will be further explained in the remainder of this paper. Generally, it is common understanding that the OMP of the proper law of contract must be applied as well, even if Article 9 does not expressly provide for this. However, they cannot really be classified as "overriding" as they do not override but form part of the governing law. 
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however, that a distinction between the two is not always feasible. 92 This is due to the fact that it is easy to interpret the one as an interest of the other and vice versa. The "public interest" required by Article 9 Rome I to be endangered does therefore not exclude the application of 2 nd generation OMP by itself, as "public" is not synonym to "state". 93
Different Interpretations in national law
Returning to the issue of jurisdiction, we can see that this is an important issue to take into account as the court's discretion is crucial with regards to the definition of what OMP constitute as well as what other OMP to apply (lex loci solutionis or even those of another law having a close connection with the case). The application of OMP is subject to the discretion of the judge who will make use of a practical approach to the application, taking into account the purpose of a certain rule and the effect that application or non-application will entail.
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He may give effect to OMP, but does not have to. Clearly, he will most likely insist on the application of his "own" law. We can identify different perceptions of overriding mandatory provisions in the national legal cultures of the member states. Even if the rules for application have been harmonized with the Rome I Regulation, the definition of, in particular, OMP is still very much at the discretion of the national judge. 95 States may take into account the specific situation, the character and aim of the norm as well as the protected interest. This may result in a situation where a rule is mandatory in one instance but not in another.
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As Kuipers points out, characteristics may become clear by way of comparison between French and German legal culture especially with regards to the protection of weaker parties. 97 French academia is willing to apply protective provisions via Art. 9, while German jurists will not be. 98 Two points of examination can be distinguished: On the one hand the content of OMP according to the national law, on the other hand, the willingness to apply OMP. The fact that France has implemented a whole Code for Consumer law and Germany to this date has not, is a first indicator for the national attitudes towards the OMP nature of consumer law.
Applicability in the light of the CESL
The possibility of an application of Article 9 when the CESL has been chosen has been subject to debate. Generally, academia argues that Article 9 can only apply when the conditions of Articles 6 and 8 Rome I are not fulfilled. Article 9 cannot be applied then because Article 6 (the special law) is not applicable. Bisping argues that this is not the case when the conditions of Articles 6 and 8 are fulfilled due to the principle of "lex specialis derogat lege generali". 121 Article 6 can be seen as a special law to Article 9, due to the author as it makes the mandatory provisions of the national law, which protect the consumer, overriding.
Also, the mandatory provisions are not overriding in general as we have seen in the first part of this paper. They are rules of contract law and thus do not fit the definition of OMP that has been favoured by international literature. They are "made" overriding by reason of formulation in Article 6, by virtue of their ability to protect the consumer. Rome I therefore takes a very favourable approach towards consumers. One could argue in that way, as OMP are of a hybrid nature, which makes it possible that private law rules form part of OMP, which are classified as MP in an internal situation. The reason by which they are overriding then, is the international nature of the legal relationship and not the rule in itself, whereas the extent of the proximity is decisive for the extent to which the OMP regulating a specific interest will apply. OMP are in this respect, nothing else than MP.
It is questionable whether the overriding mandatory provisions protecting a specific weaker party -the consumer -can still be invoked under Article 9 when they cannot, as has been shown be invoked under Art. 6. Bisping discusses this problem with regards to the CESL in his seminal article. The difference to MP lies in the fact that they do not only preclude the choice of law but also the applicable law in the absence of choice. It must be said then, that Rome I did not sufficiently clarify the relationship between the special connecting factor for consumers under Article 6 and the protection of weaker parties under Article 9. 125 Kuipers sides with Bisping in stating that generally Article 9 should not be applied if the situation already falls within the ambit of the special connecting factor, however he accords Article 9 a residual role to counter "too harsh consequences".
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This is also due to the fact that the application of Article 6 in itself is subject to conditions, which make sure it only protects the "passive" consumer. Therefore, until the CJEU renders a judgment on this matter, Article 9 application is still at the discretion of the member states, whereas diverging applications are to be expected, even if this lead to "cumulative" protection of the consumer. as it is much more problematic with regards to the differing value systems of the MS, and much less about the approximation of hard core contract law.
Harmonization of Private law thus entails the harmonization of rules with a public interest at heart. With every step towards harmonization, the discretion left to the member states in defining their public interests is narrowed, by way of the CJEUs powers to interpret Union legislation (Krombach case) and the further development of the consumer acquis. 129 The Krombach case proves to be important, as in it, the CJEU ruled that the member states must determine themselves what they consider public policy, but it is nonetheless the task of the court to "review the limits within which the courts may have recourse to that right". 130 This is transposable to an interpretation of OMP as well. A level playing field is being created, one that arguably becomes more and more narrow.
In the area of conflict between harmonization and fragmentation, Europeanism and Nationalism, the CJEU has been criticized for favouring a consistent approach over the consequences a judgment has for private parties. 131 Martinek argues, much in line with this, that the EU legislator must not exaggerate regulation in consumer law, otherwise it is even possible that the consumer finds himself in a disadvantageous situation, could be a threat to the functioning of national private law. 132 Is it then more favourable to leave consumer protection in the hands of the member states?
To that end, academia argues that a Definition of Article 9 by CJEU is needed. It is questionable whether the CJEU sees consumer protection as a public interest within the ambit of Article 9. The judgment in Ingmar GB seems to suggest that the ECJ would states and the nature of their application makes it very much doubtable that this notion will become superfluous or much controlled on the European level in the near future, with or without an autonomous interpretation.
Conclusion
We have examined the mechanisms available for consumer protection purposes under European Union law. Special emphasis was put on answering the question how the "old" soft and the "new" hard law instruments interact to that end. A development towards harmonized hard core contract law has been taking place (CESL), which also has the objective of improving consumer protection. The CESL has not entered into force yet and it is questionable whether it will do so in the near future. It has only been used as an example, in order to deduce how the development of hard core law would influence the applicability of conflict of law rules (PIL) and whether it would render (overriding) mandatory provisions superfluous or whether those remain a safety net for the member states. Special emphasis has been put on Article 6 Rome I (special law for the consumer) as well as Overriding mandatory provisions and ordre public. It was concluded that a harmonized contract law makes Article 6 superfluous, as it requires a comparison between two sets of law.
Naturally, where rules are harmonized, only on system exists. This is, of course, only the case where no gaps exist in the new supra-national legal regime. This cannot be said of the CESL: Most prominently, a gap has been left for illegality and immorality. These notions being themselves connected to the most basic ideas of morality and justice of a member state, it can be argued that the CESL is very much left to the discretion of the national legal systems nonetheless. However, as Article 6 is itself subject to conditions, this paper has examined the possibility of imposing consumer protection rules under Art. 9 and 21
Rome I Regulation. The main focus was put on OMP, due to the nature of their content and application. They have a somewhat peculiar position in the PIL regime as they, albeit being the mirror image of ordre public, are not scrutinized enough on a European level to exclude their application. It is true that the EU is more and more creating a level playing field within which the member states can exercise their right, however, it is getting more and more scrutinized. Therefore, the conclusion has been reached that an interpretative judgment of the CJEU is needed to clarify the application of OMP. As the application is done in an ad hoc manner and left to the discretion of the member states (otherwise the very purpose of OMP would be impaired) a uniform application will probably never be the case. This can also not be resolved by the CJEU rendering judgment. With regards to
